Reparations for Cultural Loss
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Destruction, damage and dispossession of culture and heritage loom large in actions pursued by indigenous peoples at the international, regional and domestic levels. Indigenous identity and cultural integrity inform the opening recitals of the preamble of the draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.¹ Reparations for cultural loss by indigenous peoples are signifi cant for several reasons. Culture and its disappearance through destruction or assimilation have been central to the colonial project and nation-building by settler states. Th ese policies and practices have had a particularly devastating eff ect on indigenous peoples because they conceive of culture and its manifestations as holistic, symbiotic, collective and intergenerational in character. Th e continuing violations of human rights standards; and ongoing impact of colonial, assimilation and discriminatory practices mean that these claims cannot be confi ned simply to historic injustices. Th ese factors in combination render indigenous claims for reparations novel. Th is chapter focuses on the challenges posed to existing international law norms by indigenous reparations claims for cultural losses.
In her earliest reports on the protection of cultural heritage, the former chairperson of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Erica-Irene Daes, observed that there was a need to acknowledge 'the colonial context for the loss of indigenous cultural heritage.'² Although the modalities of colonialism altered over time and diff ered from place to place, there was often a consistence in the responses to indigenous cultures. Indigenous peoples were driven from their territories and denied access to resources because they were viewed as competitors to settlers on the frontier. Th ey were similarly dispossessed of other elements of their cultural heritage, which together with ancestral remains were removed to 'scientifi c' collections. As indigenous population numbers depleted, it was generally assumed that they were a 'dying race', incapable of surviving the colonial onslaught. However, when their numbers stabilized, such theories had to be revised; and policies toward indigenous communities changed because they were no longer viewed as an immediate threat to the survival of the colonizers. Nonetheless, indigenous cultures continued to be viewed as 'backward' and a hindrance to national development. Indigenous children, particularly of mixed parentage, were removed from their families and communities to be assimilated into dominant, settler society and culture. Indigenous resistance to these policies and practices gained momentum and acquired greater impact at the international and national levels in the closing decades of the twentieth century when it emerged from the broader civil rights movements. Th is resistance was accompanied by claims seeking recognition, redress and reversal of past and ongoing human rights violations.³ While the proposed UN Declaration refers to 'historic injustices as a result of . . . colonisation'; it also notes that the indigenous campaign to end 'all forms of discrimination and oppression wherever they occur' continues.⁴ Indigenous reparation claims for cultural loss, and arguably for all losses, do not solely arise from past wrongs. For indigenous peoples their colonial occupation and attendant dispossession continues to the present-day. Th ey argue that the process of decolonization remains incomplete and the independence gained by states did not extinguish their peoples' right to self-determination.⁵ Th e continuing denial or limitation on the exercise of the right to self-determination is clearly manifest in respect of enjoyment and development of culture. Furthermore, while in most cases the formal apparatus of colonialism and assimilation have been dismantled, injuries and losses suff ered by indigenous communities as a result of these policies and practices is ongoing and intergenerational.⁶ And massacres, dispossession, forced relocation, assimilation and other gross violations of human rights at the hands of states, corporations and their agents are still being infl icted on indigenous peoples.
Th is chapter considers how the claims and remedies for cultural losses sustained by indigenous people, collectively and individually, push the existing boundaries of international law. First, I outline how culture and its manifestations is conceptualized by indigenous peoples. Th en, how claims for cultural loss are framed by expanding upon existing international human rights law and international humanitarian law is explained. Finally, I examine the application of recent developments at the international and regional levels to accommodate broader mechanisms of redress for cultural loss sustained by indigenous peoples.
Defi nition of culture in the indigenous context
Th e delineation of indigenous peoples' conceptualization of their cultures and its manifestations is intrinsic to appreciating the nature and scale of losses suff ered by these communities and their members as a result of the policies and practices of metropolitan powers and present-day states (and corporations). Whilst several UNESCO instruments have defi ned culture and cultural heritage,⁷ the defi nition espoused by indigenous peoples is diff erentiated by a number of key factors, including its holistic nature; the central signifi cance of land and resources; collective and intergenerational custodianship; and the importance of customary law. Each one of these elements was deliberately or concomitantly subverted by colonial contact and the resultant, ongoing dispossession.
Indigenous representatives have been involved in various initiatives being conducted under the auspices of the United Nations which articulate indigenous understanding of culture and its manifestations. Th e primary vehicles are the UN draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;⁸ and draft Principles /1994/56; and (1995) 34 ILM 541 (1993 draft UN Declaration) . Th e UN Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 March , (1995 
Bases of claims for cultural loss
It is because of these defi ning characteristics of indigenous culture and heritage that the disruption and rupture of familial and communal ties by colonial conquest of traditional territories and assimilation policies, particularly the removal of children, has had such a detrimental impact on indigenous identity and cultural integrity. Th ese policies and practices promoted the dispossession (and often destruction) of land, resources, sacred objects and ancestral remains; suppressed indigenous languages, traditional practices and customary law; and undermined the structures and relations integral to sustaining, developing, and transmitting indigenous cultures and heritage. In this section, by focusing on the draft UN Declaration and drawing on national examples, I examine the three main bases of indigenous claims for cultural loss: (1) genocide and the removal of indigenous children from their families and communities; (2) ethnocide (and cultural genocide) and dispossession of land and resources; and (3) non-discrimination and human rights, particularly self-determination in respect of cultural matters.
a) Genocide and the removal of children
Initially, two provisions in the draft UN Declaration made reference to the crime of genocide. Article 7(2) is intended to cover the same parameters as the defi nition Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subject to any act of genocide, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group.
Th e last phrase did not have to be explicitly included in the provision as it is enumerated in the defi nition of genocide contained in Art II of the Convention. Its reiteration in the draft declaration is signifi cant because of the assimilation policies of many settler states. At its fi rst session, the UN General Assembly included an agenda item entitled Resolution on the Crime of Genocide which was adopted unanimously in December 1946.³⁶ Its preamble notes that such acts 'shocked the conscience of mankind [and] result [ed] in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these groups.'³⁷ Th e resolution defi ned genocide as 'a denial of the right to existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.'³⁸ Th ere is an even greater emphasis on physical and biological genocide in the Convention. Although early drafts of the Genocide Convention had listed various cultural elements of genocidal programmes for possible inclusion in the defi nition, all but one was dropped.³⁹ Several settler states opposed a more expansive defi nition during the negotiations for the Genocide Convention for fear that their assimilation policies (viewed as part of nation-building) could be subject to international scrutiny and condemnation.⁴⁰ Th e only element of the cultural component that remains in fi nal text is the reference to the removal of children from the group.⁴¹ Since the adoption of the Convention, the international community has consistently resisted eff orts to expand the defi nition to encompass those elements rejected in Declaration appears to sanction this narrower defi nition of the crime of genocide. Th e application of the prohibition against the crime of genocide to protect indigenous peoples is included with the right to life for indigenous individuals (Art 7(1));⁴⁴ whilst, an independent provision has been incorporated to cover acts of so-called cultural genocide or ethnocide (Art 8).⁴⁵ Furthermore, whereas the relevant provision in the 1993 draft UN proposed Declaration referred to 'full guarantees against genocide'; the 2006 proposed refers to 'not being subject to any act of genocide.'⁴⁶ Indigenous representatives maintained that this amendment fundamentally diminished the original draft by removing the obligation on states to provide redress for acts of genocide.⁴⁷ Despite resistance from some state delegations, the draft recognizes that this protection is aff orded to individuals and groups.⁴⁸ It is no coincidence that Art 7 refers explicitly to the prohibition against the removal of children from their families and communities. Th is policy was actively pursued by a number of settler states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as part of their assimilation and integration policies.⁴⁹ Th e Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples found that the Canadian state from the mid-nineteenth century until the late twentieth century in its successive policies of assimilation and integration had sought to 'civilize' the indigenous inhabitants by removing their children from their families and communities and placing them in residential schools run by the state and various Christian churches.⁵⁰ Its report found that the removal of children was part of a broader scheme of nation-building which required 'order, lawfulness, labour and security of property' and the 'concomitant marginalization of Aboriginal communities.'⁵¹ Th e schools' curricula were designed to inculcate the children 'to see and understand the world as a European place within which only European values and beliefs had meaning; thus the wisdom of their cultures would seem to them only savage superstition'.⁵² 2007, para 194; and Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić, Appeals Judgment, Case No IT-98-33 Th e devastating eff ect of these policies and practices on indigenous communities, families and individuals continues to date.⁵³ Th e impact is exacerbated because of the nature of indigenous cultures and their reproduction, as noted above. Th e US Supreme Court found in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfi eld et al, that removal of Native American children and placement in nonIndian homes and outside their culture had a 'damaging social and psychological impact on many individual Indian children.'⁵⁴ It noted that Congress had observed that: 'the removal of Indian children from their cultural setting seriously impacts on long-term tribal survival and has a damaging social and psychological impact on many individual Indian children.' Th e Supreme Court concluded that the purpose of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was to protect 'not only the interests of the individual Indian children and families, but also the tribes themselves.'⁵⁵ Th e national inquiry investigating the impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders of similar assimilation policies and practices in Australia, labelled the practice genocide.⁵⁶ Th e Commission determined that the predominant aim of the removal of indigenous children was their absorption into the non-indigenous community so that their distinct identities and cultural values would eventually disappear.⁵⁷ However, the Australian High Court and Federal Court have rejected civil actions brought by indigenous individuals removed from their families and communities pursuant to government policies. Th e courts held that the relevant laws required offi cials to act in the best interests of the child and, consequently, they did not reveal the requisite intent for genocide, that is, 'to destroy, in whole or part, . . . 
b) Ethnocide and cultural genocide
Despite the rejection of the cultural elements of genocide during the negotiation of the Genocide Convention and any subsequent multilateral initiatives related to the criminalization and prosecution of genocide, there have been initiatives to defi ne and prohibit what has come to be termed 'ethnocide' or 'cultural genocide'. Various bodies in the United Nations and non-governmental organizations have endeavoured to reconsider genocide in the context of colonial policies. UN Special Rapporteur, Nicodème Ruhashyankiko observed that assimilation, integration and cultural absorption were often foisted onto the cultural structures of indigenous communities by settler states.⁶⁰ In 1981, a UNESCO conference of experts was drawn together to consider the question of 'ethnocide' with specifi c reference to indigenous peoples of the Americas. Th e ensuing Declaration of San José defi ned ethnocide as where:
[A]n ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture and its own language, where collectively or individually. Th is involves an extreme form of massive violation of human rights and, in particular, the right to ethnic groups to respect for their cultural identity, as established by numerous declarations, covenants and agreements of the United Nations, and its Specialized Agencies . . . .⁶¹ Th e concept of 'ethnocide' as defi ned by the experts provides a bridge for the lacunae created by the compromises forged during the negotiations for the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration, discussed below.
From the fi rst session of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), indigenous representatives emphasized the importance of the Genocide Convention in understanding the contemporary circumstances of indigenous peoples.⁶² WGIP chairperson, Erica-Irene Daes, maintained that beyond physical genocide there was a need to recognize and prohibit the cultural aspects of genocidal programmes; and to protect and promote the right of a group to enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture and language. She also acknowledged that this concern manifested itself in the various provisions contained in the draft declaration including Art 7 of the 1993 draft UN declaration specifi cally enunciated an individual and collective right not to be subject to ethnocide and [T]he Genocide Convention was not constructed in terms of rights, but deals with prohibitions, individual responsibility and group protection. Translating these prohib itions of acts into rights would require a certain group element such as is found in articles 6 and 7 of the draft declaration.⁶⁷ Indigenous representatives stressed that the purpose of the article was to ensure the continuation of the distinct identities of indigenous peoples and was designed to address historic wrongs and prevent further acts of cultural genocide and ethnocide.⁶⁸ Th e failure of states to agree on any defi nition of the terms led to its deletion from the current text of the draft declaration.
Article 8(1) of the 2006 proposed UN Declaration provides that 'indigenous peoples and individuals have a right not to be subject to forced assimilation or destruction of their cultures.' Subparagraph 2 enumerates the acts which states must prevent or provide redress when they fail to prevent them. Th ey include actions to deprive indigenous peoples 'of their integrity as a distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities';⁶⁹ dispossession of land, territories or resources; forced population transfer undermining such rights; forced assimilation or integration imposed by government measures; or propaganda designed to incite racial or ethnic discrimination. While state delegations disputed the inclusion or wording of portions of this article,⁷⁰ their retention in the revised Art 8, is testimony to the fact that such actions are prohibited by existing multilateral instruments covering international criminal law, international humanitarian law and human rights law.⁷¹ Indigenous representatives emphasized that the declaration should not simply 'mirror' existing treaty obligations, but must be a vehicle enabling international law to confront the threats facing indigenous peoples.⁷² Article 8 remains innovative, even though its silences are testimony to the international community's continuing reluctance to label such acts 'ethnocide' or 'cultural genocide'. It draws together these disparate actions to defi ne what constitute a programme of assimilation or destruction of cultures prohibited by international law. Th e article does this by straddling the divide between the international crime of genocide and positive human rights related to culture and cultural heritage. Th e gap was created by the failure of the Genocide Convention to deal with the cultural elements of genocidal programmes (which is often a prelude to physical or biological genocide);⁷³ and the deliberate non-inclusion of provisions for the protection of minorities in the Universal Declaration. Not surprisingly, indigenous peoples strove to have this lacunae fi lled by the UN instrument designed to addressed their concerns.
c) Human rights and self-determination
During negotiations for the Genocide Convention, various states argued that the cultural elements of the defi nition of the crime of genocide were more appropriately dealt with by the human rights declaration which was being fi nalized at the same time.⁷⁴ Adopted the day after the Genocide Convention, it is ironic then that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not contain explicit protection for minorities. Among states which opposed the inclusion of a dedicated minority protection provision were those countries with signifi cant indigenous populations who feared that any formal recognition of collective cultural rights would undermine national stability. Th ey maintained that the principle of non-discrimination was suffi cient protection for all individuals, including indigenous persons. Indeed, the prohibition against racial discrimination has proved an important catalyst within the UN system for exposing the plight of indigenous peoples worldwide.⁷⁵ Only 18 years later, with Art 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), was the fi rst provision for the protection of minorities of universal application fi nally realized. Th e UN Human Rights Committee which oversees the implementation of the provision has described its purpose as: 'ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned . . . .'⁷⁶ Even though Art 27 is highly qualifi ed, its inclusion in the Covenant has proved decisive in aff ording a measure of protection to the cultural integrity indigenous peoples in international law.⁷⁷ While indigenous representatives have rejected their classifi cation as 'minorities', the defi nition of cultural rights applicable to their peoples refl ects the typology contained in Art 27 ICCPR but in a form which elaborates their specifi c concerns.⁷⁸ Articles 11 (enjoyment of culture), 12 (profession and practise of religion) and 13 (use of language) of the 2006 proposed Declaration were largely uncontested by state delegations when it was deliberated within the Working Group established by the Commission on Human Rights.
Indigenous representatives maintain that the recognition of their collective right to self-determination is a prerequisite to their full enjoyment of all human rights, including cultural rights.⁷⁹ Th ey argue that to be defi ned as a 'minority' by states negates the ongoing eff ects colonial occupation on their communities and its members.⁸⁰ Th ere is a greater openness by most states to recognizing the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, than for other non-state groups. However, the content of that right remains contentious. 
Redress for Cultural Loss
Th e 2006 proposed UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples not only defi nes the 'rights' of indigenous peoples but more often than not also provides a tandem requirement for states to ensure remedies for violation of such rights. Th ose parts of the draft declaration which refer to 'redress' have been the most strenuously contested by state delegates during the negotiations. Yet, it is clear that the provisions contained in the proposed declaration refl ect a growing practice among courts at the regional and national levels for awarding a range of remedies for cultural loss. Th e purpose of reparations in international law is to place the injured party in the position they would have been if the wrongful act had not occurred.⁸⁷ Th e manner in which remedies been traditionally framed in international law has meant that it has been constrained in fulfi lling this objective for indigenous peoples.⁸⁸ But as has been the case with the redefi nition of 'culture' in international law and the parameters of the rights and obligations in respect of culture and heritage; the claims by indigenous peoples for reparations test these accepted boundaries. Th ese developments must be assessed within the context of advances being made in international law generally in respect of state responsibility and reparations for violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law.⁸⁹ In this third section, I track how the recognized mechanisms of redress in international law, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-recurrence, have been reinterpreted and deployed to address indigenous claims for cultural loss.
Prior to considering each of these modes of reparation, it must be noted that they should not be viewed in isolation or as alternate forms of redress. Rather, all these remedies can be considered and utilized to ensure full reparation for the injury or loss fl owing from the wrongful act.⁹⁰ In addition, the proposed UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples enumerates rights which are held individual and collectively by indigenous peoples, and their violation aff ects individuals and communities. Accordingly, redress for these violations must be aff orded individually and collectively. Furthermore, the proposed declaration requires that 'due consideration [be given] to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned'; a practise already being followed by some regional and national courts.⁹¹ 
a) Restitution
Restitution is considered the primary remedy designed to re-establish the circumstances in place prior to the occurrence of the wrongful act.⁹² It is only when restitution is impossible or inadequate that other remedies are considered. Indeed, depending on the obligation which has been breached, if it is a peremptory norm (like the right to self-determination);⁹³ or the breach is of an ongoing character, restitution may be tied to cessation of the wrongful conduct.⁹⁴ In the context of indigenous claims for reparations, restitution is the most unsettling for states because it often involves a direct confrontation with colonial and assimilation policies and practices. Th e proposed UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples approved by the Human Rights Council in 2006, refers specifi cally to restitution at three junctures: in respect of cultural and religious property;⁹⁵ ancestral remains and ceremonial objects;⁹⁶ and land.⁹⁷ Despite state resistance, the provisions refl ect growing state practice at the regional and national levels. Several states with signifi cant indigenous populations have been forced to address the issue of restitution at the national level because indigenous organizations have brought land claims or actions for the repatriation of ancestral remains or return of ceremonial objects in their domestic courts.
Ancestral remains and cultural heritage
At the international level, the issue of return of indigenous cultural heritage was addressed by UN Special Rapporteur Martínez Cobo in his report on discrimination against indigenous peoples;⁹⁸ and a provision for the repatriation of ancestral remains and restitution of cultural heritage was incorporated into the earliest drafts of the UN Declaration.⁹⁹ Th e draft declaration adopted by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1993 referred to 'the right to the restitution' of cultural States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and eff ective mechanisms developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.¹⁰⁴ In elaborating upon this right, the 2005 revised Guidelines on the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples states that: 'Indigenous human remains and associated funerary objects and documentation shall be returned to their descendants, or custodians, as may be appropriate, in a culturally appropriate manner.'¹⁰⁵ Where these persons cannot be located then the remains will be returned to the relevant indigenous community. Furthermore, any research into the remains, even for the purpose of identifi cation, cannot take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the relevant indigenous community.
Th e reticence of certain states during negotiation of the draft declaration, to restitution of cultural heritage and repatriation of human remains was made in the face of growing state practice, at the international and domestic levels, to ¹⁰⁰ Art 12, 1993 sanction return even in respect of historic injustices. Th e international community has sanctioned restitution as a remedy in circumstances where the taking of the civilian property was contrary to the rules of armed confl ict; and a programme of genocide or persecution (crime against humanity) against a group.¹⁰⁶ For example, the international community and state organs have reaffi rmed the application of the remedy of restitution of cultural objects for Holocaust survivors and their heirs in a series of multilateral soft law instruments;¹⁰⁷ and decisions of domestic courts or administrative panels.¹⁰⁸ In respect of the repatriation of ancestral remains, the obligation to treat human remains with dignity and respect has a lengthy history in classical international law and more recently, in international humanitarian law.¹⁰⁹ Th e UN Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity provide that human remains must be returned to the family as soon as they are identifi ed.¹¹⁰ Beyond this right to know, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that for indigenous communities and other groups, the burial and care of ancestral remains is a core component of their cultural and religious observance.¹¹¹ When ordering the repatriation of human remains in the Moiwana Community Case, the Court considered the relevant customary law when assessing the impact of the inability of the community to bury the victims of a massacre according to their proscribed practices.¹¹² It found that although the events had occurred two decades before the hearing, because of the intergenerational nature of these customary obligations, the community continued to suff er a signifi cant, ongoing injury.
At the national level, following litigation brought by indigenous communities in domestic courts, several states have put in place mechanisms to repatriate human remains or restore cultural heritage to indigenous peoples.¹¹³ Th ese mechanisms have included agreements between the state and indigenous community or between states; national legislation; and code of conduct (or policy) backed by government funding. For example, Australia and the United Kingdom have issued a joint declaration that their respective governments 'agreed to increase eff orts to repatriate human remains to Australian indigenous communities.'¹¹⁴ Denmark has returned cultural materials to Greenland after the granting of home rule; and a similar process has been followed by the Danish national museum in respect of the Faroe Islands.¹¹⁵ In the United States, the federal government passed the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), which requires all national and federally-funded institutions to inventory their indigenous collections; advise the lineal descendants, relevant Native American tribe or Hawaiian organization; and return ancestral remains, grave goods and cultural objects to the descendants or community.¹¹⁶ In Canada and Australia, the national museums association adhere to a voluntary code of conduct when a request is made by an indigenous community; and in the Australian case, the means that the information or research arising from materials must not be published without the 'free, prior and informed consent' of the relevant community and benefi ts arising from it being shared equitably.¹²⁴ Restitution of another form of intangible heritage, that is, archives, fi lm, photographs, and ancillary materials held by non-indigenous institution can redress violations of the individual and collective right articulated in Art 8 concerning 'forced assimilation or destruction of their cultures'.¹²⁵ Th e importance of the restitution of archival and related materials in ameliorating the eff ects of gross or systematic violations of human rights is increasingly being recognized at the international and domestic levels.¹²⁶ Archives including genealogies and photographic collections can go some way to reversing the eff ects of assimilation policies and practices by facilitating the reconstruction of individual and collective identity, re-establishment of familial and communal connections, and reinforcing title to land.¹²⁷ right to religious profession and practices has proved problematic for indigenous peoples in the domestic sphere when their right is balanced against third party and national interests.¹³⁰ Th e proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is more explicit. Article X covering spiritual and religious freedom provides: '[w]hen sacred graves and relics have been appropriated by state institutions, they shall be returned.'¹³¹ Beyond this specialized reference to immovable heritage, the general provisions related to land, territories and resources (formerly grouped under Part VI) of the draft UN Declaration must be considered because of their central importance to indigenous identity and cultural integrity, discussed above. Article 28 provides a right to redress in respect of land, territories and resources they traditionally owned, occupied or used and of which they have been dispossessed. Th e remedies may include restitution, and when this is not possible then compensation.¹³² At the national level, states with indigenous populations have used various mechanisms to provide recognition of indigenous land claims, including agreements;¹³³ constitutional amendments;¹³⁴ and legislative scheme providing access to courts or specialist tribunals.¹³⁵ Th e question of overlapping claims to land particularly in settler states has led to various qualifi cations on restitution of land, territories and resources to indigenous peoples; and the provision of compensation, instead.¹³⁶ However, the intrinsic importance of traditional lands to No.726, ch.959, 60 Stat.1049; in Australia: Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth); and New Zealand, Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (as amended in 1998 , 2003 .
Land and sites
¹³⁶ Th e questions of ownership of land and resources and territorial integrity were central issues raised by member states of the Africa Union when seeking a delay in the deliberation of the draft declaration by the General Assembly in January 2007: see Doc.Assembly/AU/Dec.141(VII), Add.6. the identity and cultural integrity of indigenous communities makes monetary redress, in lieu of restitution, problematic and untenable.¹³⁷
b) Compensation
Where indigenous peoples suff er cultural loss as a consequence of a wrongful act, restitution of land, territories, resources, ancestral remains, ceremonial objects, and related cultural materials is preferred because of their signifi cance for individual and collective indigenous identity and cultural integrity. However, as Shelton notes, while in international law, restitution is the 'preferred' remedy, it is often not available in cases of human rights violations.¹³⁸ So, the proposed UN Declaration sanctions compensation as an alternate mode of redress in respect of land dispossession. In such cases, compensation includes restitution-in-kind ('lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status'); or monetary compensation.¹³⁹ In respect of movable heritage, the international community has apporved restitution-in-kind or compensation where the item cannot be return either because it has been destroyed or lost.¹⁴⁰ Article 11(2) of the approved UN Declaration covering cultural heritage can be read to include these other mechanisms of redress.
Like restitution, compensation is designed to place the injured individual or community in the position they would have been had the violation not occurred. Its purpose is corrective and rehabilitative rather than punitive.¹⁴¹ However, compensation can be used to provide full reparations, in so far as the damage can not be made good by restitution.¹⁴² So, for example, the Inter-American Court in the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community Case, when assessing compensation for moral damage it consider 'the special meaning that [traditional] lands have for indigenous peoples, in general, and for the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community, in particular'. Th e Court assessed that denial of rights over traditional lands involved 'a detriment to values that are highly signifi cant to the members of those communities, who are at risk of losing or suff ering irreparable damage to their lives and identities, and to the cultural heritage of future generations.'¹⁴³ ¹³⁷ See United States v Sioux Nation, 448 US 371 (1980) that 'compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case.'¹⁴⁴ Th e enumerated heads of compensation include physical or mental harm; lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefi ts; material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential; moral damage; costs of legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical expenses, psychological and social services.¹⁴⁵ Th e Principles also defi ne a 'victim' as the immediate family and dependents of the direct victims.¹⁴⁶ Th e claims of individuals removed from their families and communities pursuant to state-sanctioned assimilation policies illustrate how compensation and rehabilitation can redress the harm caused by human rights violations. From the late twentieth century, individual claims and case actions have been brought before Australian and Canadian courts by indigenous persons who were removed from their families and communities and placed in government-or churchadministered schools and institutions, pursuant to offi cial assimilation policies.¹⁴⁷ In addition, both national governments commissioned wide-ranging national inquiries into the history, impact and possible redress for victims, and proposed law reform to prevent recurrences.¹⁴⁸ Compensation packages for the victims of these policies have been introduced in Canada and Tasmania. In March 2007, the settlement agreement for Re Residential Schools Case Action Litigation was approved by the Canadian courts. It provides for a 'common experience' fund of C$1.9 bn (with accruing interest) for a set lump sum payments to claimants who resided at Indian Residential Schools.¹⁴⁹ Th e Tasmanian government has to obtain justice; inability to bury the dead pursuant to cultural and religious norms; and the severing of the connection with their ancestral territory: Moiwana Community Case, n 6 at para 195.
¹⁴⁴ Principle pdf>. In addition, there is an independent assessment process to determine payment to claimants who suff ered sexual or serious physical harm (based on a point system for the types of abuses or harms), with additional sums for loss of earnings and earning capacity, future care (and legal costs). It is confi ned to sexual and physical harm, serious psychological injury arising from it and aggravating factors (including racist acts); and not to psychological injury connected to 
c) Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation has also been sanctioned a mechanism for redress particularly in respect of gross violations of human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law.¹⁵² Shelton notes:
Rehabilitation seeks to achieve maximum physical and psychological fi tness by addressing the individual, the family, local community and even the society as a whole. 
d) Satisfaction
Th e 2006 proposed UN Declaration does not explicitly list satisfaction as a form of redress, but Art 40 provides that any decision in respect of eff ective remedies for the infringement of individual and collective rights shall 'give due consideration to . . . international human rights.' Various initiatives within the UN system which have address the issues of reparations for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law have enumerated satisfaction as a mechanism for redress.¹⁶⁰ Satisfaction is usually designed to address moral injury and provide full reparations in addition to compensation and non-monetary remedies.¹⁶¹ Th is remedy also augments the right to know and the right to justice articulated by various international bodies, regional organizations and national courts.¹⁶² Satisfaction in accordance with the right to know can include a public apology which acknowledges the facts and accepts responsibility;¹⁶³ commemorations, monuments and tributes to the victims;¹⁶⁴ and inclusion of an accurate account of the violations in relevant legal training and educational materials at all levels.¹⁶⁵ Satisfaction in accordance with the right to justice would include eff ective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;¹⁶⁶ and judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for violations.¹⁶⁷ Th e right to know is an individual and collective right. Th e right to know of victims and their families is defi ned as 'impresciptible right to know the truth about the circumstances in which violations took place and, in the event of death or disappearance, the victim's fate.'¹⁶⁸ Satisfaction would include an offi cial declaration or judicial decision restoring dignity, reputation and the rights to the victim and persons closely connected with the victim;¹⁶⁹ and the search for the disappeared, abducted or killed and assistance in the recovery, identifi cation and reburial of the deceased 'in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or the cultural practices of the families and communities.'¹⁷⁰ Th e collective or societal right to know is tied to the duty to preserve memory. Th e Updated Principles to Combat Impunity explained that the preservation of documentation pertaining to human rights violations protects a community's knowledge of their history of oppression which forms part of their heritage; and preserve the collective memory thereby guarding against revisionist negationist arguments.¹⁷¹ Th e UN Principles and Guidelines on Reparations list several forms of satisfaction designed to fulfi l this right and duty, including verifi cation of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth (only if it does not further harm to the victim).¹⁷² Judicial proceedings and commissions of inquiry have been recognized as avenues to realizing this mode of satisfaction.¹⁷³ Tied to these proceedings is the duty to ensure the preservation of, and access to, archives concerning violations.¹⁷⁴ Archives are crucial for education, research and remembrance for individuals, indigenous communities and the wide community.¹⁷⁵ In addition, archives can be central to the right to justice by providing information and resources for reparation claims arising from internationally wrongful acts and gross violations of human rights.¹⁷⁶
e) Guarantees of non-repetition
Guarantees of non-repetition or non-recurrence are potentially the most farreaching redress for indigenous peoples.¹⁷⁷ In the context of human rights law generally, the remedy is designed to ensure that victims do not suff er violations of their rights in the future and to foster and sustain respect for human rights within the broader society.¹⁷⁸ It can include legislative reform; retraining of government, military and civilian personnel; reform of state institutions; and other structural and institutional changes.¹⁷⁹ In addition, to this remedy which is a secondary obligation arising following violation of human rights obligations; the 2006 proposed UN Declaration requires states in consultation with indigenous peoples to take 'the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of the Declaration.'¹⁸⁰ Claims for cultural loss specifi cally, and reparations generally, by indigenous peoples in settler states are bounded to the continuing violation of their right to self-determination and the ongoing impact of colonial occupation.¹⁸¹ Indigenous representatives argued that the reversal (or at least amelioration) of both can only be achieved through wide-scale structural and societal changes involving a renegotiation of political, economic, social and cultural arrangements with states.¹⁸² Th e 2006 proposed UN Declaration recognizes that 'indigenous peoples have the right to freely determine their relationships with States in a spirit of coexistence, mutual benefi t and full respect.'¹⁸³ It also states that they have a right to 'autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and ¹⁷⁶ See Principles 14-17, Principles to Combat Impunity, n 89; and Museums Australia, CCOR, n 117, pp 7-8.
¹⁷⁷ Guarantees of non-recurrence have been dealt with as part of the obligation in the Articles of State Responsibility, Art 30, n 89. While the Principles and Guidelines on Reparation, n 89 (Principle 23); and Principles to Combat Impunity, n 89 (Art 35) deal with it in respect of remedies.
¹⁷⁸ local aff airs.'¹⁸⁴ Th e 1993 draft had specifi ed that this right related to matters including culture, religion, and education.¹⁸⁵ Th ere is a broad range of examples evidencing varying levels of 'structural' reform by settler states to redress cultural losses and accommodate the right of indigenous peoples in respect to cultural and religious matters. For example, the introduction of distinct, national legislative and administrative regulations and institutions which provide redress for cultural loss and autonomy in cultural matters for all indigenous communities in the state.¹⁸⁶ Also, agreements between the national government and indigenous communities for home-rule or other autonomy arrangements which restore traditional territories and provide self-government including competencies over cultural aff airs.¹⁸⁷ Th is option provides a new framework within specifi c, discreet territories but with only limited renegotiation of the relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples within the state. On the other hand, some states with majority indigenous populations within their territory or a particular region have fi nalized agreements with these communities undertaking to transform the existing national political, civil, economic, social and cultural structures through constitutional and legal reform; indigenous consultation and cooperation; and re-education of the population.¹⁸⁸ Th ese latter agreements go beyond recognition of the right to self-determination; and seek to redefi ning relations between indigenous peoples and the non-indigenous population. Th ey include provisions covering offi cial recognition, promotion and use of indigenous languages; and education reform to incorporate indigenous languages, cultures, histories, philosophies and customary law. Th e eff ectiveness or otherwise of these arrangements is yet to be fully assessed.¹⁸⁹
Conclusion
Th ere is an increasing awareness at the national and international levels that longstanding legal, political and economic structures have either ignored or worked to the detriment of indigenous peoples. Th e most positive interpretation of this situation would be benign neglect, that is, the frameworks and institutions were not designed with indigenous peoples in mind. Yet, there is growing scholarship to show that the architects of these frameworks and institution very much had indigenous peoples, especially their land and resources, in their purview. To this end, the devaluation and negation of indigenous cultures was central to the civilizing mission of international law and nation-building of states. International law and national legal systems continue to labour under this legacy.¹⁹⁰ A legacy starkly revealed when their courts are confronted by indigenous claims for reparations.
To assume indigenous peoples have been passive objects of colonial, assimilationist and discriminatory practices and processes, is to deny their active, persistent resistance to them. Th is chapter has focussed on reparations claims pursued by indigenous communities and its individual members for cultural loss. It has served to highlight certain key areas in which these claims are challenging and redefi ning accepted norms in international and domestic law. Firstly, indigenous conceptualization of their cultures and its protection cannot be reconciled with the predominant view in international law and national legal systems as cultural manifestations as individuated property. It is only with an appreciation of indigenous understanding of their culture as holistic, symbiotic, communal and intergenerational that a clearer assessment of the nature and extent of losses sustained by indigenous peoples can be made. It is to understand that monetary compensation for dispossession of heritage which is not property, but is integral to its cultural and spiritual integrity, is inconceivable. It is to understand also that restitution of part must be accompanied by restitution of the whole, including land. For many settler states such concepts and claims (especially pertaining to land), confront not only existing legal, political, social and economic orders but the history and identity that these nations have constructed for themselves.
Second, after the horrors of the Second World War in the mid-twentieth century, the international community strove to construct a new international order. Th e Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were guiding examples of this new order. Yet, the omissions contained within these two documents suppressed an issue for which states with indigenous populations did not want to be held to account: the plight of these communities in their territories. Th e silence of both instruments on assimilation and destruction of cultural integrity has been addressed by the proposed UN Declaration on the ¹⁹⁰ See generally Anaya, n 5; A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, 2004) ; and Vrdoljak, n 99. Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It is hoped that Art 8 will provide that bridge between the prohibition contained in international criminal and humanitarian law and the rights protected by international human rights law. Finally, indigenous claims for reparations, particularly for cultural harm and loss have added a further dimension to the growing fi eld of redress for human rights violations. Every head of redress has been utilized and reformulated in the eff ort to provide a full reparations for historic and ongoing injuries and loss. However, these reparations claims must be appreciated within the broader campaign being pursued by indigenous peoples for recognition and enjoyment of their collective and individual human rights, especially the right to self-determination. States and international community are slowly opening up existing frameworks and institutions to indigenous concerns and participation especially in cultural matters. Today, aversion to indigenous demands remains in many quarters. And even states which have engaged in broad-based dialogue with indigenous peoples to negotiated reform of all levels of society are fi nding that implementation remains problematic but vital.
